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Abstract
This paper scrutinizes the paradox of the increasing objective yet diminishing
subjective value of citizenship in Western states. The decreasing subjective value
points to an inevitable lightening of citizenship, which persists despite states’ recent
efforts to upgrade and re-nationalize citizenship by ceremony, civic integration tests,
and more exclusive rights. I discuss some features of citizenship light, most notably
instrumentalism and a dissociation of citizenship from nationhood. The recently
court-empowered European Union citizenship serves as an illustration.
Keywords: Citizenship; Immigration; Liberalism; Nationalism; Sociology of the
State; Europe and the European Union.
T h e c u r r e n t e v o l u t i o n of citizenship poses a paradox.
On the one hand, in a world of huge and growing disparities of wealth
and security, yet one that is more connected than ever by technology
and ideas, the objective value of citizenship (in the right kind of state)
must further increase. On the other hand, for the lucky ones in pos-
session of it or close to it, citizenship’s subjective value is likely to be
low and lower. This paradox is exemplified by two strikingly opposite
recent statements on the ‘‘worth’’ and trends of citizenship in the
West, Ayelet Shachar’s The Birthright Lottery (2009) and Peter
Spiro’s Beyond Citizenship (2008). Shachar (2009) points to the
startling fact that much of the world’s riches and life-chances are
divided up by the morally arbitrary fact of birth, considering that 97
percent of the world’s population are citizens at birth (only three
percent being naturalized and thus former immigrants). The near-half
of the world’s population that is born with the ‘‘wrong’’ citizenships,
mostly in the poverty zones of Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa, has to survive on less than $2 a day; children born in the
poorest nations are five times more likely to die before the age of five.
Is there more need to underline the value of citizenship in the West?
At the same time, contrary to the contractual underpinnings of the
9
Christian Joppke, Universite americaine de Paris, [cjoppke@aup.fr].
Arch.europ.sociol., LI, 1 (2010), pp. 9–32—0003-9756/10/0000-900$07.50per art + $0.10 per pageA.E.S.,
2010
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975610000019
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Universitätsbibliothek Bern, on 01 Mar 2017 at 06:38:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.
or
g/
10
.7
89
2/
bo
ri
s.
38
75
 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
13
.3
.2
01
7
modern state and the achievement ideology of modern society,
citizenship is acquired for most as a ‘‘form of inherited property’’
(Shachar and Hirschl 2007, p. 254). But whereas the morally cor-
rupting and dysfunctional consequences of inheriting material wealth
have been amply debated and subsequently curtailed by law (see most
recently Beckert 2007), the transmission of political membership still
proceeds much like the feudal ‘‘fee tail’’ or ‘‘entail’’ regime for
inheriting landed property in medieval England, in which property
transfer is untaxed and infinite in duration, land much like citizenship
being passed on ‘‘from one generation to another in perpetuity’’
(Shachar and Hirschl 2007, p. 270).
While most scholarship on citizenship has zeroed in on the ‘‘gate-
keeping’’ function of citizenship, bickering about the lot of (always
few and privileged) immigrants who are thereby included or excluded,
the ‘‘wealth-preserving’’ aspect of hereditary citizenship for the vast
rest, our naturalized immigrants included, has faded from view – this
is, indeed, the ‘‘‘black hole’ of citizenship theory’’ (Shachar and
Hirschl 2007, p. 274). Who would deny that if inherited citizenship,
this ‘‘striking exception to the modern trend away from ascribed
statuses in all other areas’’ (Shachar 2009, p. 13), is to prevail, taxing it
or requiring human services in terms of a ‘‘birthright privilege levy’’
as a price for their privilege is the minimum that the lucky ones owe
those who are born in the wrong places, without any wrongdoing
on their part, and without much of a chance of even joining the
intrinsically small elite of immigrants. Never has the worth of citizen-
ship and its morally uncomfortable consequences for the privileged half
of humankind been more effectively expressed.
Contrast this with Peter Spiro’s Beyond Citizenship (2008), which
– he submits – should really have been called The End of Citizenship
(Spiro 2008, p. 7). As if nothing had happened in the past two decades,
both in the real world and in the world of scholarship, it reiterates and
applies to the case of the United States the ‘‘post-national member-
ship’’ diagnosis that Yasemin Soysal (1994) had met for early-1990s
Europe. Yet there is much going for it, as Spiro rehearses well-known
facts that do not thereby become less true. With globalization, the
‘‘importance of space and territorial boundaries declines’’ (Spiro 2008,
p. 4), and so does the importance of the one institution defined by
space and territory: the state. In a world of increasingly condoned
multiple citizenships and strengthened alien rights, citizenship in that
diminished institution, the state, must mean less than in the past. The
‘‘declining legal significance of the status’’, in turn, reinforces the
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‘‘waning intensity of bonds among members’’ (ibid., p. 6). The fact
that ‘‘over-inclusive’’ jus soli citizenship in America, which continues
to be available even to the children of illegal immigrants or mere
transients, has not stirred much debate demonstrates for Spiro the
‘‘declining importance of citizenship itself’’ (ibid., p. 30). As he
intriguingly suggests, there is a ‘‘feedback loop of diluted ties’’:
‘‘The larger the group of happenstance citizens, the less likely the
status will be consequential, which renders existing citizens more
accepting of expansive admission criteria and the addition of nominal
members, which in turn entrenches the lack of consequence’’ (ibid.,
p. 31). In other words, the larger the radius of citizenship as formal
status the less it can mean in terms of rights and identity.1 With
respect to rights, citizenship is said to make ‘‘very little difference’’
(ibid., p. 81). That is both old, resonating with America’s traditionally
thin citizenship, and new, as even the mid-1990s onslaught on the
welfare rights of immigrants could be revoked piece-by-piece so that,
once again, there is ‘‘near equality for the purposes of state assistance’’
(ibid.). Conversely, except for jury duty, there are no specific obliga-
tions of citizenship, because taxes and even military service are also
imposed or imposable on resident aliens. With respect to identity,
‘‘America’s dilemma’’ is that ‘‘inclusion dilutes identity’’ (ibid. p. 157).
Predictably, and more questionably, buying into the hyphenated citizen-
ship scenario of contemporary citizenship studies (Isin and Turner
2002), according to which there is a plethora of (sexual, cultural, urban,
global, ecological etc.) citizenships in the plural, Spiro sees ‘‘the center
of community’’ shifting to ‘‘locations other than the state’’ (Spiro 2008,
p. 137), such as the gated communities and other private bodies that now
‘‘regulate our existence’’ (ibid., p. 148). As the state is downgraded to one
of many forms of association, ‘‘the significance of membership issues
outside of the state will grow in proportion to the importance of non-
state communities’’ (ibid., p. 151), and membership in all of these other
groups is also conceivable in terms of citizenship. So, in lieu of one
citizenship there are many citizenships for each one of us, without any
single one that might trump all other memberships.
This raises the question: how can citizenship be both ‘‘back with
a vengeance’’ (Shachar 2009, p. 2) and in ‘‘irreversible’’ decline (Spiro
2008, p. 162)? The answer is: it is a matter of perspective, and
particularly of factoring in or out host states’ immigration policies.
1 For the distinction between status,
rights, and identity as key dimensions of
citizenship as the latter meets the fact of
immigration, see Joppke (2007).
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Shachar’s perspective is mainly that of the losers in the ‘‘birthright
lottery’’, which condemns the majority of humanity to poverty,
starvation, and early death. For no other group, the majority of
mankind, is the objective value of citizenship more apparent. But, in
addition, because immigration policy is factored out of the analysis,
citizenship law is seen as doing all the cuts. By contrast, Spiro’s
perspective is above all that of the legal immigrant elite that, having
cleared the crucial hurdle of territorial access, may choose between
permanent residence and citizenship. The indisputable truth in
Spiro’s analysis is that the value of an immigrant visa by far surpasses
that of formal citizenship. Contrary to the current citizenship rhetoric
beloved of politicians of all stripes and countries (see below; also
Joppke 2008a), ‘‘the real prize is legal residency, not citizenship. It’s
all about the green card, not the naturalization certificate’’ (Spiro
2008, p. 159). Contemporary campaigning for upgrading citizenship
may bring about cosmetic change to this reality; it cannot change it at
heart. Conversely speaking, only the immigration policy watchdog has
allowed citizenship to take on the lightened contours that it indisput-
ably has throughout the West. Only because the vast majority of
humankind is locked out from the purview of Western states’ citizen-
ship by these states’ immigration policies (which by definition are vastly
more exclusive than inclusive, even in their most generous variants),
could citizenship become more porous at the fringes and could the
distinction between citizen and legal resident alien become blurred.
I. Re-nationalizing citizenship?
If Spiro’s provocative line of citizenship ‘‘almost gone begging for
customers’’ (Spiro 2008, p. 91) did not capture an element of truth,
contemporary campaigns for upgrading citizenship, conducted from
Europe to Australia, would be meaningless. These campaigns are
desperate, yet ultimately futile, rearguard actions against the in-
evitable lightening of citizenship in the West, that is, against a citizen-
ship that is easy to access, whose rights do not go much beyond the
rights that many non-citizens already enjoy, and whose identity is thin
and procedural, incapable of sharply setting apart one nation-state
society from other such societies.
Britain is a prime example of a state desperately seeking to re-
nationalize a citizenship deemed too light and inconsequential for its
12
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(prospective) incumbents, which, of course, has a long pedigree in
Britain (not unlike America’s historically thin citizenship). The
current Labour government’s strategy has been to ‘‘raise the visibility
of national citizenship in response to growing anxieties about identity
and migration in our more fluid societies’’ (Goodhart 2006, p. 9).
Apart from prescribing symbols and ceremony and the introduction
of a standardized citizenship test in 2005, which is little more than
catching up with the United States in this domain, there is a novel,
hard legal element to this strategy, which is to tie more rights and
benefits to formal citizenship than to legal resident status. Concretely,
Goodhart advocates a ‘‘formal two-tier citizenship’’, with a ‘‘tempo-
rary British resident status with fewer rights and duties’’ and a ‘‘more
formal, full citizenship’’ (ibid., p. 44). Goodhart’s thrust is to draw
a thick line between citizenship and all other statuses, in lieu of
drawing it between citizenship and legal permanent residence and all
other statuses, as is the legal status quo in Britain and elsewhere in the
West. This idea was picked up in 2008 by the Goldsmith Commission
that advised the British government on citizenship policy. As its final
report bluntly states, ‘‘[p]ermanent residency blurs the distinction
between citizens and non-citizens. We should expect people who are
settled in the UK for the long-term to become citizens’’ (Goldsmith
2008, p. 6). The British Labour government under Gordon Brown,
perhaps wisely so, refused to follow the Goodhart/Goldsmith recom-
mendation to abolish the permanent residence category (and with it
Soysalian ‘‘postnational membership’’), arguing that ‘‘it is [not] right
to force people to become British citizens should they wish to remain
here permanently’’ (Home Office 2008b, p. 10). However, the British
government still took some steps toward redrawing the lines between
residence and citizenship, first, in excluding temporary residents from
all forms of social assistance, and, secondly, in tripling (from one to
three years) the duration of the (relatively) rights-deprived limbo
period of so-called ‘‘probationary citizenship’’ for those whose
aspiration is merely permanent residence and not the acquisition of
citizenship (ibid., p. 14).
One wonders: If citizenship in the comfort zone matters more than
ever, why this nervous attempt, especially in Europe, to upgrade
something the priceless worth of which is beyond doubt? The answer
is that the new citizenship talk is to compensate for a significant
opening for legal immigration in Europe, highly selective and skill-
focused, but deeply unpopular nevertheless. As a result of this
opening, the immigration policy watchdog is less available than in
13
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the past to permit drift on the citizenship front. Moreover, the
function of citizenship talk is less to be found in its illocutionary
purpose of integrating newcomers than in its perlocutionary effect of
pacifying ill-disposed natives. Witness that the transition to what the
current British Labor government calls ‘‘earned citizenship’’ is
nervously in sync with public preferences, distilled as it is from an
unprecedented three-month exercise of ‘‘consultation’’ and ‘‘listening
meetings’’ with the public (Home Office 2008a, 2008b). The intel-
lectual blacksmith of New Labour’s citizenship policy, David Good-
hart, does not hide the fact that his proposals are ‘‘defensive measures
designed to persuade an anxious public that populists do not in fact
have the answers and that British citizenship [. . .] remains valued and
protected by mainstream politics’’ (Goodhart 2006, p. 55 f).2 It is not
by accident that the country that prides itself on having become
Europe’s biggest immigration magnet is also the country with the
most robust, notionally re-nationalized citizenship policy. Conversely,
one might argue that the flower of post-nationalism (still best
articulated by Soysal 1994) had blossomed in a context of intended
zero-immigration, when the rhetorical (never factual) denial of
territorial access had taken the drama out of the permanent-residence
versus citizenship tango.
In an earlier issue of this journal, I had depicted contemporary
citizenship as being in the cross-fire of de- and re-ethnicizing forces,
catering to immigrants and emigrants, respectively, both equally
galvanized by globalization processes, yet with opposite political-
ideological connotations (Joppke 2003). Almost a decade later, with
sufficient time for post-2001 Islamic terrorism to have worked out
its devious implications for citizenship, the subtly nationalist ‘‘re-
ethnicizing’’ trend has been dwarfed by an open campaign for
‘‘re-nationalization’’, partially revoking a prior (‘‘de-ethnicizing’’)
liberalization of access to citizenship (particularly through raising
the hurdles for naturalization). The new citizenship tests, which are
mushrooming from the Netherlands to Australia, are a prime example
of this. The rallying cry of interior ministries from The Hague to
Canberra is that citizenship is to be more difficult to attain and more
highly ‘‘prized’’ than in the past; it is to be the ‘‘first prize’’ as
a Dutch Immigration Minister inimitably put it (quoted in Van Oers,
de Hart, and Groenendijk 2006, p. 403). This campaign combines
2 For a critique of Goodhart and New Labour’s strategy of ‘‘mollifying Middle England’’,
see Pathak (2007, p. 265).
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contradictory philosophical elements. On the one side, there is the
‘‘neoliberal’’ emphasis on ‘‘responsibilizing’’ the individual (to put it
with David Garland, 2001), holding her responsible for her own
successful, officially certified integration without which citizenship
would be denied to her, thus unburdening resource-starved states
from integrative tasks they no longer can or will fulfill. On the other
side, there is a renewed emphasis on cultural assimilation, which had
been repudiated under the old reign of ‘‘de-ethnicizing’’ citizenship,
though with the new twist that liberalism is the culture that new-
comers are to be socialized into.3 With an eye on the particularly
drastic case of the Netherlands, one author characterized the resulting
amalgam as ‘‘neoliberal communitarianism’’ (Schinkel 2009), claiming
that it implied a ‘‘re-sacralization’’ of the nation. While this may be
the goal of the political elites who talk the citizenship talk, it is
immediately undermined by its ‘‘neoliberal’’ component, which
subjects citizenship to the rational calculation of individuals. Witness
that citizenship as ‘‘earned’’ or as ‘‘prized possession’’ is still a rather
utilitarian thing whose measure of worth is what’s in it for the
individual – how could it ever become the basis for a ‘‘re-sacralized’’
nation?
II. Into the heart of citizenship light: instrumentalism
Almost in passing, David Goodhart (2006) concedes a fundamental
limit to upgrading or re-nationalizing citizenship in current times.
‘‘The modern nation-state’’, Goodhart (ibid., p. 17) argues, ‘‘is based
not on a universal liberalism but on a contractual idea of club
membership’’. To the degree that this metaphor holds, citizenship
is vitiated by instrumentalism, giving a lie to his principled rhetoric of
‘‘progressive nationalism’’. Along such lines, one economist recently
asked whether citizenship was turning into a ‘‘voluntary club member-
ship’’, analyzable in terms of the theory of club goods (Straubhaar
2003). Like clubs, states provide goods whose consumption is ‘‘non-
rivaling’’ among its members yet from which non-members may still
be ‘‘excluded’’. To the degree that, in a world of migration, more
and more people choose their state, states become ‘‘instrumental
3 For evidence that applied ‘‘political lib-
eralism’’ is the main content of the new
citizenship tests, see Michalowski’s (2009)
instructive comparison of four Western
European countries and the US.
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associations’’ (Zweckgemeinschaften), like clubs. From this follows,
incidentally, a robust admissions policy, according to which the
‘‘benefits’’ for existing members must always exceed the ‘‘cost’’ of
accepting new members. Still, extant norms of non-discrimination
have to be respected, the two legitimate admissions criteria being
a capacity to pay (Zahlungsf€ahigkeit) and a willingness to accept the
club rules (Rechtsbewusstsein). This mirrors the current emphasis on
economic self-sufficiency and civic proceduralism in states’ revamped
naturalization laws.
However, Thomas Straubhaar (2003, p. 87) sees one ‘‘decisive
difference’’ between states and clubs: ‘‘the state can force its citizens
to risk their lives for the protection of the community’’. This echoes
Michael Walzer’s (1983, p. 41) observation that states are not like
clubs because state membership is involuntary for most, while club
membership is always and inherently voluntary. Identity, we know, is
most strongly invested in the non-chosen aspects of human existence,
and this is what states have nonchalantly poached on in the high noon
of nationalism, when citizenship was not light but indicative of
a ‘‘community of character’’ (ibid., p. 62).
However, which state in the West still asks its citizens to ‘‘un-
conditionally subordinate individual interest’’ to that of the collectiv-
ity (Straubhaar 2003, p. 86)? Even America, where nationalism is
stronger than elsewhere in the West, no longer asks its native sons to
risk their lives on the battlefield – while a good number of poor non-
citizen immigrants are doing so each day, in a professional army that
provides them with a job and a prospect for life.4 Some thirty years
ago, Morris Janowitz noticed a ‘‘priority on rights versus obligation in
the political process of Western political democracies’’ (Janowitz,
1980, p. 1), which exposes as empty rhetoric the ritual notion that
citizenship rests on a ‘‘balance of obligations and rights’’. As alarmist
and fashion-pandering as much of the ‘‘decline of citizenship’’ talk is,
an indisputable element of truth is its pointing to a new context of
‘‘post-heroic geopolitics’’, which makes ‘‘the role of the patriotic
citizen far less crucial to [. . .] the state’’ (Falk 2000, p. 13). Most
historical expansions of citizenship rights, especially social rights,
such as Britain’s Beveridge Plan that promised cradle-to-the-grave
welfare benefits for everyone, occurred in the aftermath of war, being
4 In February 2009, the Pentagon even
announced to recruit immigrants with tem-
porary visas (and not just, as before, legal
permanent residents), offering them a short-
cut to citizenship (‘‘US army ‘wants more
immigrants’’’, BBC News, 15 February 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk).
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compensation for citizens’ having put their lives at risk for the
collectivity. To the degree that recruitment for battle and participation
in war has disappeared as a general citizen obligation in the West, and
to the degree that the professional soldier has replaced the citizen
soldier, the historical engine of citizenship rights and of strong
citizenship identities has irretrievably died, luckily so one must add.5
Now that a globalizing economy integrates the West and that the
woes of war have become relegated to the Rest, an instrumental attitude
to citizenship cannot but grow and grow. If one revisits Rogers
Brubaker’s classic ‘‘ideas and ideals’’ defining membership in the
nation-state (Brubaker 1989, pp. 3-6), which were ‘‘largely vestigial’’
by the late 1980s, one must conclude that twenty years later they have
become more vestigial still. Of his six ‘‘ideas and ideals’’6, only the norm
that membership should be ‘‘democratic’’ still unambiguously holds, as
especially European states have made huge strides toward turning
immigrants into citizens. In the past few decades, there has been
a thorough liberalization of access to citizenship in Europe, which could
only partially be reversed by recent restrictions on naturalization
(Joppke 2008b). By contrast, with some exceptions, Western states have
largely given up on the idea that state-membership should be ‘‘unique’’
(Brubaker 1989, p. 4), and dual citizenship has become increasingly
tolerated. With the idea of ‘‘uniqueness’’, indeed, goes that of the
‘‘sacredness’’ of membership, which had echoed the religious origins of
nationalism. It is less citizens than professional soldiers that still ‘‘die for
[the state] if need be’’ (ibid., p. 4), and this is immediately (and
realistically) profaned as ‘‘blood for oil’’. With respect to the idea that
membership should be ‘‘socially consequential’’ the post-welfare state
has shifted responsibility from the collectivity to the individual (a good
overview is Gilbert 2002). As this is a trend that has affected citizens
and immigrants alike, one can no longer say that the thinning social
privileges of membership ‘‘define a status clearly and significantly
distinguished from that of nonmembers’’ (ibid., p. 4). Finally, the
front-line of contemporary state campaigns for upgrading citizenship
is injecting new life into the notion that state-membership should be
‘‘based on nation-membership’’ (Brubaker 1989, p. 4), that is, a ‘‘com-
munity of language, mores, or belief’’ (ibid.). But the collective self that
5 The relationship between military ser-
vice and the evolution of citizenship has been
in the center of the work of Morris Janowitz,
by now largely forgotten (e.g., Janowitz
1978, ch. 6).
6 Brubaker’s (1989, p. 3) six membership
norms are: ‘‘egalitarian’’, ‘‘sacred’’, ‘‘na-
tional’’, ‘‘democratic’’, ‘‘unique’’, and ‘‘so-
cially consequential’’.
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is conveyed in these campaigns is thin and procedural more than thick
and cultural (see Joppke 2008a).
Instrumentality is even directly inscribed into some of states’
immigration and citizenship rules, which provide access in return
for (sizeable amounts of) cash. While the ‘‘investor visas’’ of Britain,
America, and more recently Germany are widely known, much less is
known about the fact that some countries, including Austria, the latter
in curious departure from its usual hard-lining in this domain, have
moved ahead in offering not just immigrant visas but citizenship for
cash. For an investment estimated to exceed $2.5 million, one can
‘‘buy’’ Austrian citizenship, without any prior residence, language or
even interview requirements, the paperwork being done by a consult-
ancy that offers to ‘‘liaise with the various government agencies and
ministries, and then prepare and lodge your application’’ (in the
Austrian case, for the hefty fee of $300 000).7 Such a passport buys its
lucky owner visa-free access to 125 countries and territories in the
world. Surely, the fact that such schemes usually operate in secret,
along with a denial that it is ‘‘just a matter of handing money over and
getting citizenship’’8, shows the operation of the norm that citizenship
should not be instrumental.
However, what goes under the label of ‘‘transnational citizenship’’9
is infested to the core by instrumentalism. That is, after all, why states,
from Australia to Mexico, have given in to it in terms of accepting
dual nationality, which used to be anathema to most of them as recent
as ten or fifteen years ago. Rainer Baub€ock (2008) wishes to discipline
transnational citizenship by means of a ‘‘stakeholder’’ principle
according to which the exercise of full political rights in two or more
polities would be limited to those who can prove a ‘‘genuine connec-
tion’’ with the respective societies. This would save the essence of
citizenship as ‘‘equal membership in a self-governing political com-
munity’’ (ibid., p. 7). But politics, while certainly the single most
problematic aspect of transnational citizenship, is definitely not the
gist of it. Instead, economics and personal advancement are. This is
why states, on the sending and receiving ends, have given in to it. With
an eye on East Asia’s resourceful diasporas on the North American
7 ‘‘Pledge of allegiance’’, The Economist (1
February 2007) (downloaded from
www.economist.com).
8 An official at the Austrian Ministry of
Economic Affairs, quoted in ‘‘Pledge of
allegiance’’, The Economist (op.cit.).
9 In Rainer Baub€ock’S (2007, p. 2395)
definition, transnational citizenship refers to
‘‘a triangular relationship between individu-
als and two or more independent states in
which these individuals are simultaneously
assigned membership status and member-
ship-based rights or obligations’’.
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West Coast, Aihwa Ong (1999) has dubbed the new phenomenon
‘‘flexible citizenship’’, which refers ‘‘to the strategies and effects of
mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking to both
circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by select-
ing different sites for investments, work, and family relocation’’. It
sports such colorful figures as ‘‘astronauts’’, shuttling across borders
on business, and ‘‘parachute kids’’, who are ‘‘dropped off in another
country by parents on the trans-Pacific business commute’’ (ibid.,
p. 19). Flexible citizenship is an affront to the classic ideals of nation-
state membership, but it is condoned and furthered by these very
states as an ‘‘instrument of flexible accumulation’’, allowing them ‘‘to
compete more effectively in the global economy’’ (ibid., p. 130).
III. Beyond nationhood: EU citizenship
Instrumental attitudes toward citizenship are indicative of a disso-
ciation between citizenship and nationhood. This key feature of
citizenship light is best illustrated by the new European Union
citizenship, which is arguably the most innovative and fast-moving
citizenship construct in the world today. If one wants to look into the
future of citizenship, this is perhaps where it is to be found. EU
citizenship is entirely built around the fact of immigration, or what in
Europe is referred to as ‘‘free movement’’. It is Roman to the core,
providing rights of free movement within Europe, and giving short
shrift to the Greek package of politics, democracy, and duties (for the
distinction between ‘‘Roman’’ and ‘‘Greek’’ citizenship strands, see
Pockock 1995). It is worth while rehashing Euro-lawyer Joseph
Weiler’s early diatribe against the ‘‘Saatchi and Saatchi European
citizenship’’ (Weiler 1999, p. 335): ‘‘To conceptualize European
citizenship around needs (even needs as important as employment)
and rights is an end-of-the-millennium version of bread-and-circus
politics’’. But where in the West (apart from Israel, Weiler’s spiritual
home) is there more to citizenship than rights and almost no duties;
where is it marked by ‘‘belongingness and originality’’; where does it
provide a ‘‘shield against existential aloneness’’ (ibid., p. 338)? Citizen-
ship may have been all the things when tied up with nationhood. But it
is no longer – at the level of European nation-states no less so than at
European Union level. If the national is ‘‘Eros’’ and the supranational
is ‘‘civilization’’ (ibid., p. 347), this distinction rests on a romanticized
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vision of national citizenship, one of ‘‘civic responsibility and conse-
quent political attachment’’ (ibid., p. 333), that may exist in the mind
of the political theorist but not in the real world.
Certainly, Weiler’s (1998) defense of a pluralistic Europe has a long
pedigree. From the start, there were two competing visions of Europe,
the statist vision of a United States of Europe, analogous to the United
States of America, and a supranational vision of an ‘‘ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe’’, as expressed in the preamble of the
1957 Treaty of Rome that set up the European Economic Community.
Couching the European project in citizenship terms, as occurred with
the introduction of a EU citizenship in Article 8 of the 1992 Treaty on
European Union (Maastricht Treaty), threatened to give victory to
the statal unity vision of Europe, at the cost of its true supranational
potential of a Europe of ‘‘multiple demoi’’. The latter – as Weiler
formulates with an eye on the continent’s dark 20th century history –
‘‘is about affirming the values of the liberal nation-state by policing
the boundaries against abuse’’ (Weiler 1999, p. 341). However, what
Weiler wishes to see at the European level: ‘‘citizenship as a hallmark
of differentity’’ (ibid., p. 329) and a ‘‘decoupling [of] nationality from
citizenship’’ (ibid., p. 337), has long occurred at the nation-state level.
Establishing such citizenship at European level can only accelerate a
train that has long departed. In sum, there are no statist or nationalist
dangers in dubbing Euro membership ‘‘citizenship’’, because citizen-
ship as ‘‘Eros’’ is already chimera at state-level.
But what is European Union citizenship? Originally introduced in
1992, what is now Article 17(1) of the EC Treaty stipulates: ‘‘Citizen-
ship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.
Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
citizenship’’. The last sentence was inserted in the 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty, as a defensive measure by member states, when the European
Commission had pushed for a residence-based Euro-citizenship that
would include third-state nationals (Europe’s ‘‘immigrants’’ proper)
(Ferrera 2005, p. 142 f). But this ‘‘nay’’ has no legal meaning, because
the peculiarity of the EU if compared with state citizenship is set in
stone by the preceding sentence: EU citizenship is not grounded in an
own EU nationality law but is secondary to holding the citizenship of
a member state. This is not unusual in the history of federal citizen-
ships: before the 14th amendment to the US Constitution in 1868, and
before the 1913 Imperial Citizenship Law, American and German
citizenships, respectively, were both derived from sub-federal state
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memberships. By the same token, the derivative quality of EU
citizenship is unlikely to be stable, if one also considers the ‘‘vital
connecting function which nationality plays in Community law’’
(O’Leary 1993, p. 66) and the notorious tendency of the European
Court of Justice to arrogate to itself the definition of such terms.
In this respect mirroring contemporary state citizenships, EU
citizenship is essentially about rights – there is a token reference in
Article 17(2) of the EC Treaty that EU citizens ‘‘shall be subject to the
duties imposed (by this Treaty)’’, only no duties worth the name can
be found in the entire text (not even the duty to pay taxes, which could
never in any case be an exclusive citizen duty). Instead, suitably
figuring ahead of political rights at local and European (notably, not
national) levels that in reality no one cares about10 (provided in Article
19), the primary Euro-citizen right is the fabled right of free
movement, stipulated in Article 18(1): ‘‘Every citizen of the Union
shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid
down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect’’.
As the right of free movement is one of the four classic Euro-
freedoms11 dating back to the EC’s first hour as a ‘‘common market’’,
Joseph Weiler (1996) had originally dismissed its elevation into citizen
right as ‘‘a cynical exercise in public relations’’ – no new rights were
added to already existing rights. There was ground for this, as the
‘‘limitations and conditions’’ proviso in Article 18(1) seemingly folded
back ‘‘citizens’’ into ‘‘workers’’ or other economic agents, whose
moves (and no one else’s!) were regulated by the EC Treaty.
‘‘Europe’’, after all, is at heart a functional regime to coordinate the
economies of member states, peopled by ‘‘factors of production’’
(Weiler 1996), not a territorial state, peopled by citizens. Hence the
original polemic against EU citizenship as merely a ‘‘market citizen-
ship’’ (Everson 1995). Even a most recent, last-nail-in-the-coffin
attack on the ‘‘poverty of postnationalism’’ reiterates the well-known
line that EU citizen status is a ‘‘derivative status that creates no new
rights’’ (Hansen 2009, p. 6).
This is no longer true. European citizenship is postnational
citizenship in its most elaborate form, belatedly vindicating Yasemin
10 See Adrian FAVELL’S (2003, p. 20) ob-
servation that ‘‘European citizenship (as pro-
viding political rights, CJ) is not
a particularly salient issue to Eurostars’’
(‘‘Eurostars’’ being EU nationals living and
working in other member states).
11 The four Euro freedoms are ‘‘free
movement of goods, persons, services and
capital’’ (EC Treaty, article 3c).
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Soysal’s earlier claim in this respect (1994, p. 148). What the past
critics of an underwhelming EU citizenship could not know, and what
current critics overlook, is the activism by the European Court of
Justice that has transformed EU citizenship from a derivative status
into a free-standing source of rights. Worthy to be labeled ‘‘post-
national’’ if there ever was justification for the term, EU citizenship in
its presently expansive form is entirely the product of court rules, with
only the thinnest relationship to an identity or a demotic force that
might warrant the extensive rights that now accrue to Euro-citizens.
In a string of bold and controversial decisions handed down be-
tween 1998 and 2004,12 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) estab-
lished two fundamental novelties that member states could not have
fathomed when launching their window-dressing EU citizenship in
1992: first, that there is a right to free movement and residence inher-
ent in EU citizenship, regardless of previous EU law that required
a variant of economic activity; secondly, that there are, next to formal
rights of free movement and residence, substantive social rights that
accrue to EU citizens qua citizens, outside prior economic status
categories. The battle cry accompanying this stunning rights expan-
sion has been the ECJ dicton, included in its September 2001 land-
mark judgment on Grzelczyk, that ‘‘Union citizenship is destined to
be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’’.13 This
is either a misnomer or a glimpse into the future, as EU law even in its
currently expansive form does not apply to the purely internal situa-
tions of member states but only to situations where a cross-border
component is involved. However, as this limitation entails ‘‘reverse
discrimination’’ against domestic citizens, who, for instance, now per-
versely have lesser family unification rights under national law than
border-hopping EU citizens may enjoy in the same country under
European law, it is unlikely to be stable. Unless, of course, the ECJ
shifts to a lower gear, but this has not been its usual way of proceeding.
If one reads the ECJ rules on EU citizenship from Martinez Sala
(1998)14, which was the first to base equal access to a member-state’s
social benefit on EU citizenship status, to Trojani (2004)15, which
effectively allows EU citizens to bootstrap their right of residence by
12 The best available summary is Craig
and De Burca (2008, ch. 23). See also Wind
(2009).
13 European Court of Justice, Case C-184/99,
Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, at paragraph 31.
14 European Court of Justice, Case C-85/96,
Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern.
15 European Courtof Justice, CaseC-456/02,
Trojani v Centre public d’aide sociale de
Bruxelles.
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tapping the social assistance schemes of their host states, one can
almost hear the cry of pain of member states, ‘‘But we never meant it
this way’’. As one of the few Euro-lawyers sympathizing with the lot
of member states points out, the European Court of Justice has raided
the worker versus non-worker distinction that secondary Community
law, in terms of directives and regulations, continues to uphold
(Hailbronner 2005). Indeed, among the ‘‘limitations’’ and ‘‘condi-
tions’’ of longer-term cross-border movement and residence by non-
economic actors is their possession of ‘‘sufficient resources’’ and of
‘‘sickness insurance’’. This is to avoid benefit tourism and free
movers’ becoming an ‘‘unreasonable burden’’ on the welfare systems
of host states.16 However, ECJ case law has blithely ignored, and
thereby effectively destroyed, these restrictions. In Trojani (2004), the
court peculiarly endorsed a bootstrapping strategy on the part of EU
citizens that is not unlike the benefit tourism outlawed by secondary
Community law. As the court argued in this case, of course, there was
no right of residence for non-workers who lack ‘‘sufficient resources’’.
However, as long as a person was lawfully present in a host member
state on some other basis (in this case, Belgian national law), she was
still entitled to access non-contributory social assistance under the
same conditions as nationals. And recourse to social assistance could
‘‘not automatically’’ lead to the revocation of a residence permit.17
Held to observe the principle of ‘‘proportionality’’, member states
must not equate ‘‘recourse to the social assistance system’’ with the
‘‘lack of sufficient resources’’ that may trigger expulsion. In other
words, by having equal access to social assistance, a Euro-citizen can
buy herself out of the ‘‘lack of sufficient resources’’ proviso, so that it
is effectively void as an obstacle to benefit tourism. ‘‘This seems to be
logical’’, finds a Euro-lawyer (Verschueren 2007, p. 326). The non-
initiated are more inclined to call it twisted reasoning, beloved of
lawyers. It is the stuff out of which European citizenship is made.
The activism of the European Court of Justice has made EU
citizenship ‘‘socially consequential’’ of sorts (Brubaker 1989, p. 4), but
only to the diminishing degree that the national citizenships still
exhibit this quality. In fact, such Europeanization must undermine
‘‘strong national rights of social and industrial citizenship’’, without
the compensatory rise of strong ‘‘supranational rights’’ in a Europe
16 Directive 2004/58/EC of 29 April 2004
on the right of citizens of the Union and their
family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States,
preamble at paragraph 10.
17 ECJ decision on Trojani, at paragraph 45.
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that remains socially vacuous (Streeck 1997; more generally Scharpf
1999). Because, in the absence of strong solidarities at European level,
the enthusiasm of nation-states to provide tax-based social benefits
from which the rest of Europe cannot be excluded, and that may even
be consumable anywhere in Europe, must cool down. Accordingly, when
European Union law threatened to make ‘‘exportable’’, and thus usable
by return migrants anywhere in Europe, a planned supplementary
pension scheme (the so-called Fink Modell) that was meant to assist
elderly people in coping with the high cost of living in Germany, the
German government rather abandoned the idea, which at first had been
supported across the political spectrum (Conant 2004, p. 306).
The main conflict stake in the social expansion of EU citizenship
was a new type of non-contributory ‘‘mixed benefits’’, which straddles
the boundary between social insurance and social assistance, and
whose purpose is to ‘‘establish a safety net of last resort for the whole
citizenry’’ (Ferrera 2005, p. 131; see also van der Mei 2002, p. 552 f).
Examples are a guaranteed minimum income for the elderly poor, the
long-term unemployed, the disabled, and other vulnerable categories.
The creation of such schemes, need-based, tax-paid and thus an
expression of a ‘‘‘we-ness’ that typically bind the members of
a national community – and them only’’ (Ferrera 2005, p. 133), has
been the gist of welfare state development during its Golden Age in
the 1960s and 1970s. States intended them for their citizenry only.
Article 4 of Regulation 1408 of 1971, which coordinated the social
security schemes of Europe for its ‘‘migrant workers’’, excluded from
the ambit of the regulation ‘‘social assistance’’, as which one might
think the new welfare policies should be classified.18 However, the
regulation fails to provide a clear definition of either social assistance
or social insurance. So it fell to the European Court of Justice to fill
the gap, and the court defined the entire mixed benefit schemes
emerging since the 1960s, to the consternation of member states, as
‘‘social insurance’’ rather than ‘‘social assistance’’ and thus subject to
inclusion in Regulation 1408.
The landmark case is Frilli (1972), in which the ECJ defined
a supplementary pension benefit, which Belgian law had reserved to
Belgian nationals, as ‘‘social security’’, and thus also accessible to
other Europeans – the reason being that it ‘‘does not prescribe
consideration of each individual case, which is a characteristic of
18 Council Regulation (EC) n0 1408/71 of
14 June 1971, on the application of social
security schemes to employed persons, to self-
employed persons and to members of their
families moving within the Community.
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assistance, and confers on recipients a legally-defined position giving
them the right to a benefit.’’19 In sum, to the degree that the new
‘‘mixed type’’ benefits were not charity but a right, for which there
was no discretion on the part of the granting state, they qualified as
‘‘social security’’ and all Europeans had to be included in them. In
a next step, the ECJ ruled a similar pension supplement in France
exportable, so that ‘‘French taxpayers were de facto subsidizing some
poor elderly people in Italy’s Mezzogiorno’’ (Ferrera 2005, p. 134).
Making such benefits exportable renders the policy ad absurdum,
because the purpose of mixed type policies is to guarantee a minimum
subsistence level that is determined by the cost of living in the host
state, which is likely to be higher than the cost of living in the mostly
less developed states or regions into which the benefit is carried.
No wonder that European member states responded to the ECJ’s
creativity on the social rights front by way of ‘‘evasion, overrule, and
preemption’’ (Conant 2004, p. 317). Interestingly, as nationality-based
restrictions of the mixed welfare measures became unsupportable
under European law, the only defense left for member states was
‘‘control over residence’’ (Ferrera 2005, p. 135). This was accom-
plished in Council Regulation 1247/92 of 30 April 1992, which
stipulated that ‘‘special non-contributory benefits’’, as explicitly listed
for each country in an annex to the 1971 social-security regulation,
had to be granted only in the territory of residence, and only if strict
legal residency requirements were fulfilled (on the complexities of
establishing residence, see van der Mei 2002, pp. 564-566).
This is precisely where the European Court of Justice’s bold foray on
European Union citizenship kicked in, because now states were no longer
protected from an all-European claimants’ onslaught on their welfare
systems by limiting access to them to (however expansively defined)
‘‘workers’’. In Grzelczyk, the Belgian authority denying a ‘‘minimix’’
minimum subsistence allowance to a French student deemed itself
protected by the fact that he was not a ‘‘worker’’, and thus subject to
the ‘‘sufficient resource’’ proviso that could impossibly be circumvented
by tapping the host state’s social coffers.20 The Belgian and Danish
governments submitting opinions in this case reiterated the classic line
that citizenship of the Union had ‘‘no autonomous content’’21, apart
from the rights deriving from the EC Treaty and secondary legislation,
and the latter clearly upheld the worker versus non-worker distinction.
19 Judgment of the European Court of
Justice of 22 June 1972, Case 1-72, Rita Frilli
v Belgian State, at paragraph 14.
20 ECJ decision on Grzelczyk (op.it.), at
paragraph 13.
21 Ibid., at paragraph 21.
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And the French government warned that granting the minimex to
a foreign student would ‘‘amount to establishing total equality between
citizens of the Union established in a Member State and nationals of that
State, which would be difficult to reconcile with rights attaching to
nationality’’.22 This ‘‘total equality’’ is exactly what the ECJ’s Grzelczyk
decision accomplished, in famously declaring that ‘‘Union citizenship is
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States,
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the
same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality.’’23
As the ECJ haughtily decreed in Grzelczyk, member states had to
‘‘[accept] a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of
a host Member State and nationals of other Member States’’, particu-
larly if the difficulties of a Euro citizen were only, as in this case,
‘‘temporary’’.24 This astonishing stipulation glosses over the fact that
there is a fundamental ‘‘tension’’ between freedom of movement and the
‘‘principle of solidarity’’ (Giubboni 2007). In the demonstrable absence
of a genuine Euro-solidarity on the part of governments and their
citizens, the ‘‘financial solidarity’’ that is exacted on host states and their
tax-paying citizens is not free-standing but parasitic upon the national
solidarities that it relies upon but does nothing to refurbish.
If the logic of Europe is to move from a nationality- to a residence-
based sense of citizenship, one would think that ‘‘immigrants’’ proper
(‘‘third-country nationals’’ in Euro-jargon) fare well in this. Indeed,
contrary to the standard pronouncements in the activist world and by
most academics, immigrants have done very well in Europe. This is
because it is inherently difficult to justify a distinction between two
types of internal free movers, one with and another without a Euro-
pean passport (but with legal permanent residence). There is a stinging
sense that both types of free mover should be treated equally. As
common as this view is, it is a truly radical view, because it erases the
citizen-immigrant distinction. While it may be fed by certain ‘‘post-
national’’ developments at member state level (of the kind reported in
Soysal’s [1994] classic work), above all it shows the power of the de-
nationalizing logic of the European Union. Equality between both
types of mover would be achieved if EU citizenship were redefined ‘‘as
based on residence and not on nationality’’ (Besson and Utzinger
2007, p. 581). While this does correspond to the logic of EU citizen-
ship, it certainly is not at present politically realistic.
22 Ibid., at paragraph 22.
23 Ibid., at paragraph 31.
24 Ibid., at paragraph 44.
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Even short of this ideal scenario, however, significant progress in
binding immigrants into Europe has been made. Those immigrants
covered by an association agreement between the EU and their origin
country, due to the help of the European Court of Justice, now enjoy
‘‘explicit European legal rights’’ that in many respects approximate,
and sometimes even perversely exceed, those of member state
nationals (Conant 2004, p. 315). Incidentally, the number of non-
EU immigrants protected by an EU association agreement (2,3
million Turks; 1 million Moroccans; 600 000 Algerians; and 250 000
Tunisians) almost matches the number of EU free movers, which
stands at 4,9 million.25 A second immigrant group that has achieved
near-equality with EU citizens are the family members of EU citizens,
which enjoy ‘‘quasi-citizenship rights’’ (Besson and Utzinger 2007,
p. 13). And, considering that the 1971 Council Regulation on social
security was extended to third-country-nationals in 2003, one must
conclude that ‘‘[i]n the employment and welfare areas [. . .] third
country nationals now enjoy virtually the same rights and obligations
as nationals’’ (Ferrera 2005, p. 144).
Of course, the one exception to non-EU immigrants’ near-equality
with EU citizens is free movement rights, which accrue to EU citizens
unconditionally, but to third-country nationals only after five years of
legal residence, and then with further strings attached. In this respect,
the promise of the 1999 Tampere European Council, which was to
grant third country nationals ‘‘rights and obligations comparable to
those of EU citizens’’, has not been quite fulfilled.26 After the effusive
prospect of an EU citizenship based on residence had to be shelved,
the emphasis by immigrant advocates indeed shifted toward ‘‘approx-
imat(ing)’’ the legal status of immigrants to that of EU nationals.27
The demarche of the European Commission and of the advocacy
groups aligned with it became the creation of a ‘‘civic citizenship’’ for
immigrants, attributed by virtue of residence rather than nationality.
Judged by the major fruit of the ‘‘civic citizenship’’ campaign, the
2003 Long-Term Residents Directive,28 the rights of immigrants trail
those of EU citizens in two respects. First, in line with state-level
25 Combined, Europe’s two migrant pop-
ulations that fall within the ambit of EU law
are at ca. 9 million, which constitutes slightly
under three percent of the total EU popula-
tion (Conant 2004, p. 314 f).
26 Tampere European Council, 15 and 16
October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, at
paragraph 18.
27 Tampere European Council (op.cit.), at
paragraph 21.
28 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25
November 2003, concerning the status of
third-country nationals who are long-term
residents.
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immigrant rights, the EU-level immigrant rights are highly frag-
mented and stratified, with students, asylum-seekers, refugees, and
temporary workers all excluded from the ambit of the Long-Term
Residents Directive.29 Secondly, even the status of the most privileged
immigrant group, long-term legal labor migrants, remains subject to
the logic of ‘‘market citizenship’’ (Everson 1995). Article 5 of the
Long-Term Residents Directive requires ‘‘stable and regular resour-
ces’’ and ‘‘sickness insurance’’ as preconditions for long-term resident
status. No such conditions are imposed on EU citizens for acquiring
permanent resident status. As Mark Bell (2007, p. 329) astutely
observed, ‘‘whilst Union citizenship is transiting away from the
market citizenship model, this is being reconstructed in respect of
third country nationals’’. A further obstacle not known to EU citizens
is making third-country nationals ‘‘comply with integration condi-
tions, in accordance with national law’’30, which enshrines at EU level
the civic integration policies toward immigrants now practiced in
more and more countries of Europe.
The fact of persistent formal inequality between immigrants and
citizens in the European Union is unsurprising – as long as there is an
immigration policy at whatever level, national or European, it could
not be otherwise. What does surprise is couching the campaign for
immigrant rights in the language of (civic) citizenship, and this not by
an activist fringe but by the official core of Europe. This shows that
European citizenship is ‘‘conceptually decoupled from nationality and
as a matter of fact from any form of European nationalism’’ (Besson
and Utzinger 2007, p. 576). Whatever there is in terms of a European
identity, it is thin and procedural, epitomized by the so-called
Copenhagen Criteria that exclude no state from membership as long
as it is a market economy, democratic, and respectful of the rule of law,
human rights, and the acquis communautaire.31 As an imaginative
lawyer foresees (Davies 2005, p. 53), in shifting the focus of rights and
belonging from nationality to residence, ‘‘Europe does not just require
the absorption of foreigners, but also the rejection of expatriates’’.
This truly postnational moment has not yet been reached, and
perhaps it never will be. But there is the prospect of ‘‘[a] community
[. . .] defined by its current members more than its history, [. . .]
29 Article 3(2) of the Long-Term Residents
Directive (op.cit.).
30 Article 5(2) of the Long-Term Residents
Directive (op.cit.).
31 Of course, Article 0 of the Maastricht
Treaty stipulates that any ‘‘European State’’
may file an application to join the EU, and
not, say, Japan, so that geography and culture
cannot be exorcized from the definition of
‘‘Europe’’.
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constantly reinventing itself and changing, belonging to those who
participate, not those selected at birth’’ (ibid., p. 56). This is, indeed,
a ‘‘model that looks rather American’’ (ibid., p. 55). It is the prospect
that European citizenship holds – a blessing for cosmopolitans, but
a curse for whom citizenship should not be light but home (for an
intriguing plea for citizenship as ‘‘home’’, see Sacks 2007).
IV. Conclusion
EU citizenship apparently is implicated with the lightening of
citizenship both as dependent and as independent variable, itself
exhibiting some of the features of citizenship light, but also reinforc-
ing the lightening of citizenship that is happening independently at
member state level. As a citizenship in its own right, EU citizenship
used to be ridiculed as a misnomer, but the more interesting optic is to
see in it the future of the real thing. Built at the turn of the new
millennium, it is a citizenship of our time, entirely free of the baggage
of nationhood and nationalism that, however phantom-like, ensnares
the citizenships of old. States deem themselves in control because
access to European citizenship is still through holding a national
citizenship. But this is deceptive. In reality, the court-driven empow-
erment of European citizenship casts a long shadow over contempo-
rary state campaigns to upgrade the worth of national citizenship. If
the British government, as discussed above, seeks to attach more
rights to the status of citizenship and in parallel to lessen the
attractions of legal permanent residence, this is entirely futile:
European Union law commands the inclusion of all EU foreigners
and of long-settled immigrants into any upgraded national citizen
privileges. In fact, looking back from the European plane at current
state attempts to re-nationalize citizenship, the state campaigns are
revealed as smoke and mirrors – ‘‘symbolic politics’’ if ever there were
any. The future of citizenship is bound to be light, and lighter still
with the help of ‘‘Europe.’’ Conversely, citizenship could be the
opposite of light only at the cost of ‘‘Europe’’, which is what its
proponents carefully fail to mention.32
So, after Coca Light, ‘‘Empire Lite’’ (Ignatieff 2003), and too many
other light things to count, now there is also Citizenship Light. The
32 For a gloomier view of the ‘‘return of nationalist integration policies across all of
Europe’’, see Favell (2008).
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notion admittedly raises more questions than it can answer. Most
importantly, what is its opposite? Obviously, a national citizenship that
trumps an individual’s other memberships and allegiances. But the
moment of such citizenship, in which rights were balanced by obliga-
tions but where, in turn, rights were more exclusive to the status of
citizen than they are today, was shorter than commonly believed. Above
all, it was tied up with a less commendable world of warfare and inter-
state violence. It is therefore odd that states like Britain, committed like
few others to the contemporary world of global trade and peaceful
exchange, are nostalgically clinging to a national citizenship that in this
case had never even really existed. Note that in modern times citizenship
arose together with the idea of human rights, which has always provided
its liberal-universalistic core. Most rights listed in the French 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen were human rights, while
the first – and still today – quintessential citizen right (in Article 6) was
the political right to vote and stand for office. ‘‘Citizenship’’ proper thus
is an intrinsically political and collective concept, whose Rousseauian
possibilities were more often suppressed by Schmittian realities – at least
this has been the experience of Europe’s dark 20th century. To the
degree that a return to this world is not desired, certainly not by the
liberal elites that now prescribe re-nationalized citizenship, the further
rise of citizenship light is inevitable indeed, if only because there is no
desirable alternative to this.
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Resume
Montee de la valeur objective de la citoyen-
nete dans les pays occidentaux et diminution
de sa valeur subjective font paradoxe. Les
E´tats ont beau faire des efforts pour donner
de la solennite a` l’octroi de la citoyennete
(ceremonie de naturalisation et test d’inte-
gration), la conclusion s’impose : la citoyen-
nete s’alle`ge inevitablement. L’article analyse
certains aspects de ce processus, en parti-
culier l’instrumentalisme et la dissociation
entre nationalite et citoyennete. Le debat
juridique sur la citoyennete europeenne sert
d’illustration.
Mots cles : Citoyennete ; Immigration ;
Liberalisme ; Nationalisme ; Sociologie de
l’E´tat ; Europe et Union europeenne.
Zusammenfassung
Das Paradox eines objektiv steigenden aber
gleichzeitig subjektiv sinkenden Werts der
Staatsb€urgerschaft in westlichen Staaten
verdient eine genauere Untersuchung. Ihr
subjektiv abnehmender Wert weist auf ein
unausweichliches ‘‘Leichterwerden’’ der
Staatsb€urgerschaft hin, trotz gegenl€aufiger
staatlicher Initiativen, den Staatsb€urger-
status aufzuwerten und zu re-nationalisieren
(zum Beispiel durch symbolische Verleihun-
gen, Einb€urgerungstests und exklusivere
Rechte). Ich skizziere einige Elemente der
‘‘leichten’’ Staatsb€urgerschaft, insbesondere
Instrumentalismus und eine Trennung von
Staatsangeh€origkeit und Nationalit€at. Die
durch Entscheidungen des Europ€aischen
Gerichtshofs m€achtig vorangetriebene
Unionsb€urgerschaft dient als Illustration.
Schlagw€orter : Staatsb€urgerschaft; Einwan-
derung; Liberalismus; Nationalismus;
Staatssoziologie; Europa und die europ€aische
Union.
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